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INTRODUCTION
The Internet is one of the most diverse forums for individual
communication ever invented. Persons with unusual or unpopular ideas
can find online communities of like-minded individuals. Consumers can
research products or services they want to buy or use, and find information
about other consumers’ actual experiences. The Internet hosts information
on a vast array of subjects, from politics to health to financial matters to the
ordinary issues of day-to-day life, and allows people to pass on that
information to others who share their interests, regardless of their
geographic location.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230,
has been critical to protecting and expanding this forum, facilitating the
exchange of opinions and ideas within these diverse online communities by
encouraging both large and small intermediaries to open forums for
discussion, free from fear of liability for what someone else says. Congress
wrote Section 230 expansively, covering individual intermediaries – the
users of online forums. Under the cloak of federal immunity, such
individuals are protected from being held liable for exchanging others’
articles or observations as part of the dialog carried on through newsgroups,
weblogs, listservs, or through the simple action of forwarding an interesting
message to a group of friends.
Plaintiff-Respondent Terry Polevoy seeks to reverse this rule and
exclude those individual intermediaries who pass on third party information
over the Internet. To adopt his argument, however, would be to read the
term “user” out of the statute and thus deprive a significant set of Internet
intermediaries of the protection that Congress intended to provide.
Both the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) and the American
Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (“ACLU-NC”) are deeply
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concerned about Polevoy’s argument and its ramifications for individual
users. Amici frequently provide information to Internet users about the
legal implications of their intended behavior. In this capacity, both amici
hear from users who are concerned about potential liability and find
reassurance in Section 230.
For instance, EFF provided information about Section 230 to the
owner of a website that provides a valuable service to renters: it allows
tenants to share their opinions about apartments and landlords around the
country with other potential tenants. Not surprisingly, property
management firms often view this website; so far, however, probably
because of the protections of Section 230, no one has filed a claim against
this website.
Similarly, the ACLU-NC relied on Section 230 in defending the
creator of a website that gave students at a community college an
opportunity to evaluate their professors. The webmaster was sued for
defamation by two professors who claimed that some of the student
comments about them were defamatory. Curzon Brown v. San Francisco
Community College District, San Francisco Superior Ct., Case No. 307335.
The ACLU-NC believes that the arguments it made under Section 230 were
instrumental in causing the plaintiffs to ultimately dismiss their suit.
Section 230 is similarly important to participants in newsgroups,
weblogs, listservs, and bulletin boards, as well as users of email, who not
only use these forums to express their own views (for which liability will
still attach) but to make available or discuss the views of others.
Accordingly, amici respectfully urge this Court to reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Federal law provides that
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No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content
provider.
47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1), and that
[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability
may be imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section.
id. § 230(e)(3)).1
As California and other courts have held, Section 230 “immunizes
providers of interactive computer services . . . and their users from causes
of action asserted by persons alleging harm caused by content provided by
a third party.” Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 830 (2002);
Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 692 (2001) (city
immune under § 230 from liability for public library’s providing computers
allowing access to pornography); see also Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998) (“[b]y
its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a
third-party user of the service”).
The relevant statutory text expressly grants providers and users the
same immunity on the same terms. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“[n]o provider
or user . . . .”); see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 2812 (2004) (the “language of § 230(c)(1)
confers immunity not just on ‘providers’ of such services, but also on
‘users’ of such services.”). This parity of treatment is also reflected in the
statute’s second immunity provision, subsection 230(c)(2), which uses the

1

The statute contains important exceptions that are not at issue in this case.
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (excepting federal criminal liability);
§ 230(e)(2) (scope of intellectual property laws remain unchanged).
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same phrasing of “[n]o provider or user. . . .” Basic principles of statutory
construction require that the word “user” be given effect, and plaintiff
Polevoy’s claim that the statute does not apply to users such as Rosenthal
can be disposed of on this point alone.
The text of Section 230 also makes clear that Congress created this
immunity in order to limit the impact on the Internet of federal or state
regulation imposed either through statute or through the application of
common law causes of action. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4) (the Internet and
other interactive computer services “have flourished, to the benefit of all
Americans, with a minimum of government regulation”; id. § 230(b)(2)
(“[i]t is the policy of the United States” to minimize Internet regulation).
This policy of regulatory forbearance clearly applies to the
imposition of defamation liability for the communications of others. As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found in the seminal case
interpreting Section 230, such liability was, “for Congress, simply another
form of intrusive government regulation of speech.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at
330 (“Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of
Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference
in the medium to a minimum.”). Congress thus recognized in Section 230
what the U.S. Supreme Court later confirmed in extending the highest level
of First Amendment protection to the Internet: “governmental regulation of
the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of
ideas than to encourage it.” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
Thus, California courts and courts across the country have upheld
Section 230 immunity and its policy of regulatory forbearance in a variety
of factual contexts. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (website
operator immune for distributing email sent to listserv); Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (Internet dating
service provider was entitled to Section 230 immunity from liability
4

stemming from third party’s submission of false profile); Gentry, 99
Cal.App.4th at 830 (eBay is entitled to immunity); Kathleen R., 87
Cal.App.4th at 692 (library not liable for providing access); Schneider v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 39 (Wash.Ct.App. 2001) (online bookseller
providing forum for others to submit book reviews is “interactive computer
service” provider (“ICS provider”));2 Doe v. America Online, 783 So.2d
1010, 1013-1017 (Fl. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 208 (2000) (§ 230
immunizes America Online (“AOL”) for negligence); Ben Ezra, Weinstein
& Co. v. America Online, 206 F.3d 980, 984-985 (10th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000) (no liability for posting of incorrect stock
information); Marczeski v. Law, 122 F.Supp.2d 315, 327 (D. Conn. 2000)
(individual who created private “chat room” was ICS provider entitled to
immunity); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 982 F. Supp. 44, 49-53 (D.D.C. 1998)
(AOL has Section 230 immunity from liability for content of independent
contractor’s news reports, despite agreement with contractor allowing AOL
to modify or remove such content).
Given this backdrop, there can be no doubt that Section 230 protects
Rosenthal against respondents’ claims as to her reposting of the Bolen
article.
ARGUMENT
I.

Under Federal Law, Rosenthal is Immune from Civil Liability
for Republishing Tim Bolen’s Article.
In adopting Section 230, Congress sought to effect a number of

different, but interrelated policies. Most important in the context of this
appeal, Congress believed that minimizing government regulation of the

2

An ICS provider is defined as “any information service, system, or access
system provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users
to a computer server.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
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Internet would “maintain the robust nature of Internet communication.”
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1) (“rapidly developing
array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to
individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability
of educational and informational resources to our citizens”); id., (a)(3)
(“Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity”); id., (a)(4)
(“Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the
benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation”); id.,
(b)(2) (“preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation”); id.,(b)(3) (“encourage the development of
technologies which maximize user control over what information is
received”).
Accordingly, in creating the immunity of Section 230(c)(1),
Congress “made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful online speech
through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve
as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages.” Zeran,
129 F.3d at 330-31. California and other courts have endorsed this
reasoning. Gentry, 99 Cal.App.4th at 828-831 (following Zeran and other
§ 230 decisions); Kathleen R., 87 Cal.App.4th at 698 (approving Zeran).
At the same time, Congress made a complementary policy choice to
immunize from liability both providers and users who choose to exercise
editorial discretion over information provided by another. 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(2)(A) (“No provider or user . . . .”) (emphasis added); See also
Schneider, 31 P.3d at 41 (“Congress intended to encourage self-regulation,
and immunity is the form of that encouragement.”).
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A.

Rosenthal qualifies for Section 230 immunity.

Immunity under Section 230 requires that: “(1) the defendant be a
provider or user of an interactive computer service; (2) the cause of action
treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the
information at issue be provided by another information content provider.”
Gentry, 99 Cal.App.4th at 830.
It is not disputed that the Internet newsgroups to which Rosenthal
posted Bolen’s article are “interactive computer services,” accord,
Marczeski, 122 F. Supp.2d at 327 (individual who created private “chat
room” was ICS provider), and there is no serious dispute that Rosenthal
acted as a “user” of interactive computer services. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 114
Cal.App.4th 1379, 1391 (2002) (the “parties agree Rosenthal acted as the
‘user of an interactive computer service’”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2);
Batzel 333 F.3d at 1031 (defendant was ICS user because it “uses
interactive computer services to distribute its on-line mailing and to post
the listserv on its website”); Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport Systems,
Inc., 323 F.Supp.2d 1037 (N.D.Cal. 2004) (defendant protected where it
“uses interactive computer services to distribute its on-line mailing and to
post the reports on its website”); Barrett v. Fonorow, 799 N.E.2d 916, 92324 (Ill. App. 2003) (poster of Bolen’s messages was ICS “provider or
user”).
There can also be no dispute that plaintiffs’ defamation claims treat
Rosenthal as a publisher or speaker of information. The growing body of
Section 230 case law and the statute’s legislative history clearly show that
defamation claims lie at the core of the claims for which Congress intended
to create statutory immunity from civil liability in Section 230(c)(1).
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31. Finally, there can be no doubt that the Bolen
article republished by Rosenthal was provided by Bolen, and therefore by
another “information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (defining
7

“information content provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible,
in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service”).
Polevoy seems to suggest, however, that Rosenthal should be
deemed the “content provider” of the Bolen article because she
“developed” the information. Essentially, Polevoy argues that any act that
makes material more prominent or noticeable is part of “the creation and
development.” Opening Reply Brief of Respondent/Appellant (“ORB”) at
32.
Not only did Polevoy fail to cite to the record to support his
assertions, that argument is contrary to the statute and the caselaw. As an
initial matter, under Polevoy’s broad definition of “develop,” the statutory
definition of “information content provider” would become devoid of
meaning, and all publishers would lose the statutory immunity. Section
230 would become a nullity, because all ICSs would also be information
content providers.
More fundamentally, however, Section 230 plainly immunizes a
“provider or user” from liability for editing another’s material. See 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of (A) any action voluntarily taken
in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material….”). It thus
contemplates that those who repost the material of others will be more than
simply a passive conduit. As noted by the Ninth Circuit, a central purpose
of Congress in enacting Section 230 “was to protect from liability service
providers and users who take some affirmative steps to edit the material….”
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031. Accordingly, Section 230 “precludes liability for
exercising the usual prerogative of publishers … to edit the material
published….” Id. Numerous courts have agreed. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at
330; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 985-986 (deleting of information did not
8

transform ICS provider into “information content provider”); Blumenthal,
992 F.Supp. at 49-53 (defendant not liable despite retaining full editorial
control); and Schneider, 31 P.3d at 39-43 (website not liable despite right to
edit posted mater).
Even providing the canvas upon which a third party places material
is insufficient for liability. Gentry, 99 Cal.App.4th at 833-34 (eBay not
liable despite highly structured Feedback Forum); see also Carafano, 339
F.3d at 1124-25 (Internet dating service immune even though it
“contributes much more structure and content than eBay by asking 62
detailed questions and providing a menu of ‘pre-prepared responses.’”).
B.

As a user of interactive computer services, Rosenthal’s
republication is protected by the plain text of Section 230.

Polevoy seems to think that the term “user” in the statute has no real
meaning. ORB at 21 (asserting that “user” is undefined, but references
receipt, not use, of information). This view, however, violates a “cardinal
canon” of statutory construction “that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat’l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1992).
It also violates another “cardinal principle of statutory construction”
that “a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see United States v. Menasche, 348
U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to
every clause and word of a statute.’” (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107
U.S. 147, 152 (1883))); Williams v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.4th 337, 357
(1993) (an interpretation that renders statutory language a nullity is to be
avoided).
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Courts may, of course, ignore the plain text of a statute when failing
to do so would be demonstrably at odds with the intent of the drafters. But
the plain text of the statute here is neither ambiguous nor inconsistent with
its structure. Polevoy advances no credible arguments that could justify
this Court’s excising “user” from Section 230(c)(1) or reinterpreting “user”
to mean no more than a recipient of information, and he advances no
reasonable construction of the statute that would account for Congress’s
including “user” in Section 230(c)(1).
Polevoy also argues that the overall intent of the Communications
Decency Act, which was to restrict sexually explicit content on the Internet,
should be considered in construing Section 230. ORB at 29-30, 32. But one
generally may not “invoke the broad purposes of an entire act in order to
contravene Congress’ intent embodied in a specific provision of the
statute.” International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. ICC, 801 F.2d 1423,
1430 (D.C. Cir. 1986), different result on merits reached on reh’g, 818 F.2d
87 (1987) (original decision mooted by subsequent legislation). Had
Congress wished to immunize only providers, “it knew how to do so.”
Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 492 (1994). The U.S. Supreme Court
has always been “reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any
setting.” Duncan, 533 U.S. at 174 (internal alteration and quotation marks
and citation omitted). This Court should be as well, and should reject
respondents’ arguments.
C.

Courts have not hesitated to effect the Congressional
policy of minimizing regulation of Internet speech.

As amici have already shown, one of Congress’s specific purposes in
adopting Section 230 was to minimize government regulation of the
Internet through the imposition of various kinds of state-law liability that
would inevitably inhibit the development of the Internet into the preeminent
communications medium of the 21st century. As a result, courts have not
10

grudgingly interpreted Section 230, preferring instead to give full effect to
Congress’s policy of regulatory forbearance. Thus, courts have repeatedly
rejected attempts to limit the range of actions to which Section 230
immunity applies, instead reading it broadly to cover many different state
causes of action. Gentry, 99 Cal.App.4th at 830 (summarizing cases).
Similarly, the courts have repeatedly rejected attempts to limit the reach of
Section 230 to “traditional” Internet service providers, instead treating
many diverse entities as “interactive computer service providers.” Id. at
831 n. 7.
Given that the many courts that have considered the issue have
broadly interpreted the Congressional policy of regulatory forbearance for
the Internet, it makes absolutely no sense to refuse to apply Section 230 on
its own express terms to protect a “user” like Rosenthal from civil liability
for defamation, a core concern of Section 230.
1.

The courts have read Section 230’s immunity to
cover many causes of action.
By its very terms, Section 230 prohibits the bringing of any state
cause of action or the imposition of any state liability that is inconsistent
with the statute’s provisions.3 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). This is consistent
with its policy goal of reducing “Federal and State regulation” generally.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). If Congress had not meant to create a broad
immunity that extends past defamation, there would have been no need to
provide that Section 230 does not create immunity for violations of federal
criminal law or intellectual property laws. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(e)(1), (e)(2) .
Accordingly, the courts have routinely held that the immunity
conferred by Section 230 is not limited to defamation lawsuits, or even to

3

It also has been read to immunize ISPs from federal causes of action. See
Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F.Supp.2d 532 (E.D.Va. 2003) (AOL
immune from federal civil rights claim that treated it as a publisher).
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tort actions. It extends to claims of negligence. Doe v. America Online,
783 So.2d at 1013-1017; Schneider, 31 P.3d at 41-42 (negligent
misrepresentation and interference with business expectancy). It extends to
state causes of action for violating a statute that forbids dealers in
autographed sports items from misrepresenting those items as authentically
autographed. Gentry, 99 Cal.App.4th at 828-833 (§ 230 immunity protects
against liability under Civil Code § 1739.7). It extends to unfair
competition laws. Stoner v. eBay, Inc., 2000 WL 1705637,
(Cal.Super.2000) (unpublished) (claiming eBay violated Calif. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 17200 for auctions of bootleg and other unauthorized ‘infringing’
sound recordings). It protects a library from being held liable for misuse of
public funds, nuisance, and premises liability for providing computers
allowing access to pornography. Kathleen R., 87 Cal.App.4th at 692. It
extends to contract claims. Morrison v. America Online, Inc., 153
F.Supp.2d 930, 934 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (rejecting attempt to evade § 230
immunity by claiming to be third-party beneficiary of AOL’s member
agreement with chat-room users); Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 1000,
1003-1004 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000) (applying § 230 to dismiss breach of
contract action against AOL, as well claims such as negligence, breaching a
mandated public policy, intentional nuisance, and emotional distress).
2.

The courts have read Section 230’s immunity to
cover many entities that are not “traditional”
Internet service providers.
Similarly, the courts have almost unanimously held that, while the
phrase “provider . . . of interactive computer services” may seem to refer
only to the activities of traditional ISPs, the broad policies of Section 230
require that entities as different as an online matchmaking service, a copy
shop, an online bookseller, an online auction service, a public library, and
an Internet user who created a “chat room” all receive immunity from civil
liability. Carafano, 339 F.3d 1119 (online matchmaking service is an ICS);
12

PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc., 163 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1071 (D.S.D.
2001) (photocopy shop not contested as ICS provider under § 230);
Schneider, 31 P.3d at 40 (Amazon.com an ICS); Gentry, 99 Cal.App.4th at
931 n.7 (eBay an ICS); Kathleen R., 87 Cal.App.4th at 692-693 (public
library protected by § 230); Marczeski, 122 F. Supp.2d at 327 (organizer of
chat room for discussion of dispute about plaintiff held to be ICS provider);
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (website and listserv operator held to be ICS
provider and user); Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, Inc., 2002 WL
31844907 (E.D. La. 2002) (domain name registrar is an ICS provider).
The courts’ reasoning in Gentry and Schneider is instructive.
Although in Gentry the plaintiffs had conceded that defendant eBay was a
provider of interactive computer services, the Court of Appeal went out of
its way to say:
Even if appellants had not conceded the issue, the
allegations . . . indicate eBay’s Web site enables users
to conduct sales transactions, as well as provide
information (feedback) about other users of the
service. In this way, eBay provides an information
service that enables access by multiple users to a
computer server and brings it within the broad
definition of an interactive computer service provider.
Gentry, 99 Cal.App.4th at 831 n. 7.
In Schneider, the plaintiff argued that Amazon.com, an interactive
web site operator, was not an ICS provider because web site operators
generally do not provide access to the Internet. Using Zeran as a starting
point for analysis, but relying principally on the text of Section 230, the
Washington court found that “Amazon’s web site postings appear
indistinguishable from AOL’s message board for § 230 purposes.”
Schneider, 31 P.3d at 40; id. at 41 (“Congress intended to encourage selfregulation, and immunity is the form of that encouragement.”).
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In short, virtually every court that has faced a Section 230 immunity
question has construed that immunity broadly in order to effectuate
Congress’s expressly stated policy of regulatory forbearance to encourage,
not limit, speech.
D.

Immunity for users like Rosenthal is consistent with
Section 230’s purpose of encouraging free speech.

Amici recognize that under Section 230, the rules of defamation
liability in the online world are significantly different from those in other
media. But that was a policy choice that Congress was empowered to make
— and did. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-331; Gentry, 99 Cal.App.4th
at 829; Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 52. That the defendant in this case is a
“user,” not a “provider,” cannot change the analysis given that Congress in
Section 230(c) consistently treated providers and users as co-equals. 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“provider or user”); id. § 230(c)(2) (same); id. §
230(c)(2)(A) (same).
In adopting Section 230, Congress was concerned about the chilling
effect that the possibility of tort liability for others’ speech would have on
ICS providers. “Faced with potential liability for each message republished
by their services, interactive computer service providers might choose to
severely restrict the number and type of messages posted.” Zeran, 129 F.3d
at 331.
Smaller ICSs will be especially chilled by the elimination of
distributor immunity from Section 230. For example, Separated Parenting
Access & Resource Center (SPARC) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit that operates
a website containing an Internet forum for parents who are divorcing and
having custody issues.4 See <http://www.deltabravo.net/custody/>. Faced

4

“An Internet forum, also known as a message board or discussion board,
is a web application that provides for online discussions, and is the modern
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with potential distributor liability, SPARC would need to remove posts
upon complaint, chilling the speech on this useful forum for people dealing
with important legal and personal matters.
Another example is SpamBlogging.com, which is an online weblog.
“A weblog, or simply a blog, is a web application which contains periodic,
reverse chronologically ordered posts on a common webpage.” See
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog>. Blogs are a type of public forum in
which users often add comments to the postings of other users.5
SpamBlogging.com received a demand letter from a group purporting to
represent HRiders.com, insisting that it “remove all postings about
Hriders.com from your blogs” on the basis of a defamation claim relating to
one post. See <http://www.spamblogging.com/archives/000411.html>.
While this situation was resolved, without the protections of Section 230,
SpamBlogging.com may have been forced to comply with the overreaching
request.
Also instructive is Grinnell College’s removal of Plans, a Web-based
software system that allowed Grinnell students to publish material online.
As the college’s president explained, the fear that the law “rendered the
College, as its host and arguably publisher, and people involved in
mounting and storing it liable” to claims of defamation led to the removal.
See <http://www.cs.grinnell.edu/~stone/plans-archive/plans-outage.xhtml>.
descendant of the bulletin board systems and existing Usenet news systems
that were widespread in the 1980s and 1990s. An Internet forum typically
exists as part of a website and invites users to start topics and discuss issues
with one another.” See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_forum>.
5

“Blogs run from individual diaries to arms of political campaigns, media
programs and corporations, and from one occasional author to having large
communities of writers. Some are maintained by single authors, while
others have multiple authors. Many weblogs allow visitors to leave public
comments, which can lead to a community of readers centered around the
blog; others are non-interactive.” Id.
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While amici believe that Section 230 would indeed have protected Grinnell
from such liability and that the college was ill-advised in this respect, the
college’s reaction shows how easily speech will be stifled if the Court of
Appeal’s ruling is permitted to stand.
The specter of civil liability chills the speech of ICS users at least as
much as it does that of ICS providers. Indeed, although individual ICS
users are unlikely to face the sheer quantity of messages that AOL or other
ICS providers do, at the same time, individual ICS users are also unlikely to
possess the financial resources of ICS providers. Thus the incentive to
engage in protective self-censorship is even greater for the individual ICS
user who lacks both the resources and the commercial motivation to stand
up to those who threaten litigation in order to silence speech.
The U.S. Supreme Court often takes special pains to protect means
of communication that are “essential to the poorly financed causes of little
people.” Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (upholding
right to distribute leaflets door to door); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (protecting paid editorial advertisements from libel
judgments because “any other conclusion would discourage newspapers
from carrying “editorial advertisements” of this type, and so might shut off
an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by
persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities — who
wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members
of the press”); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994) (protecting
residential signs, which are “an unusually cheap and convenient form of
communication[, e]specially for persons of modest means or limited
mobility”).
Congress thus recognized what the U.S. Supreme Court later
confirmed: The Internet is “a unique and wholly new medium of
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worldwide human communication.” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 850
(citation omitted).
In so saying, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly extolled the value of
Internet newsgroups — the forum to which Rosenthal republished Bolen’s
article — to Internet speech.
Newsgroups also serve groups of regular participants,
but these postings may be read by others as well.
There are thousands of such groups, each serving to
foster an exchange of information or opinion on a
particular topic running the gamut from, say, the music
of Wagner to Balkan politics to AIDS prevention to
the Chicago Bulls. About 100,000 new messages are
posted every day. In most newsgroups, postings are
automatically purged at regular intervals. In addition
to posting a message that can be read later, two or
more individuals wishing to communicate more
immediately can enter a chat room to engage in realtime dialogue--in other words, by typing messages to
one another that appear almost immediately on the
others’ computer screens. The District Court found
that at any given time “tens of thousands of users are
engaging in conversations on a huge range of
subjects.” It is “no exaggeration to conclude that the
content on the Internet is as diverse as human
thought.”
Id. at 851-852 (footnotes and citation omitted).
Amici urge this Court to recognize that this diversity of Internet
content does not appear by magic or come only from traditional publishers
or media giants. This incredible variety of content flows largely from the
Internet’s openness to the contributions of individuals who might otherwise
never have the resources or ability to speak to a national or global audience.
As the Reno Court noted, the Internet allows “tens of millions of people to
communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of information
from around the world.” Id. at 850 (citation omitted); see also 47 U.S.C. §§
230(a)(1), (a)(3) (Internet “represents an extraordinary advance” in
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availability of information and “offers a forum for a true diversity of
political discourse”).
Recognizing protection for users like Rosenthal thus comports with
the underlying policy of Section 230, which is intended to encourage the
creation of opportunities for members of the public to receive information
in which they are interested and to participate in discussions about topics of
interest. “The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(a)(3); see also Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027-28 (Congress sought
to encourage “the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech
on the Internet.”)
Put another way, the policy of regulatory forbearance expressed in
Section 230 protects the Internet and other interactive computer services
not only as a market for goods and services, but also as an essential
component of the marketplace of ideas. These individuals — ordinary
people of ordinary means — often do not speak for commercial purposes.
They simply engage in conversation. And when they do so, they do not
merely exchange information that they themselves have authored; they
frequently “forward” e-mail and other information found on the Internet to
colleagues, friends and family. Likewise, a user of blogs may post short
summaries or quotes from other sources as a starting point for
commentary.6 Ignoring the clear mandate of Section 230 will lead to selfcensorship and timidity by Internet users akin to that which the Zeran court
recognized would affect providers. Ordinary users will be reluctant to pass

6

See e.g. <http://slashdot.org/> (a technology-oriented blog),
<http://dailykos.com/> (a political blog), and <http://boingboing.net/> (a
blog “directory of wonderful things”).
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on information, articles, or comments of others that they find interesting or
worthy of discussion out of fear that their inability to assess the accuracy or
reliability of Internet material will provoke ruinous litigation against them.
Moreover, such self-censorship would be far less visible to society than a
decision by AOL to stop providing bulletin boards or chat rooms. In short,
the protections of Section 230 are as valuable, if not more valuable, to the
many individuals who exchange information via blogs, newsgroups or email lists.
II.

The Individual’s Interest in Reputation Can Still Be Addressed
and Protected on the Internet
Polevoy continues to argue that Section 230 violates his

constitutional interests or rights. See ORB at 25-29 (asserting a variety of
creative constitutional claims related to a right to protect reputation). All of
these ways of stating the argument ultimately reduce to an attempt to hold
Rosenthal responsible for Bolen’s content.
In making these arguments, Polevoy simply seeks to impose old
legal rules upon an entirely new medium—rules that were expressly
rejected by Congress because they conflict with the policy choice to forbear
from regulating the Internet. As the Zeran court stated, Section 230
“represents the approach of Congress to a problem of national and
international dimension.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 334. Thus, “Congress’ desire
to promote unfettered speech on the Internet must supersede conflicting
common law causes of action.”); ibid; see also Statement of Rep. Wyden,
141 Cong. Rec. H8460 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (“the Internet is the shining
star of the information age, and Government censors must not be allowed to
spoil its promise.”)
Moreover, the very nature of the Internet tends to minimize the harm
from the republication of inaccurate or defamatory material. First, the
Internet has a reputation as an “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”
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marketplace of ideas in which controversial, even outlandish, ideas are
advocated and passed on. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340
(1974) (“the erroneous statement of fact is . . . inevitable in free debate”);
id. at 342 (to create “breathing space” for free speech, courts have
“extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood”).
Internet users know that they must consider the provenance of what they
read; given their context, newsgroup postings are unlikely to be accorded
the same weight as stories in The New York Times. See Global Telemedia
Int’l Inc. v. Doe, 132 F.Supp.2d 1261 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (statement on
Internet bulletin board “strongly suggest[s] that [the statements] are the
opinion of the posters.”); Rocker Mgmt. v. John Does, 2003 WL 22149380
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (context of Internet message boards helps show postings
are opinion and hyperbole, not actionable fact).
Second, because of its easy accessibility, the Internet provides the
subject of an allegedly defamatory comment a meaningful chance to reply.
One of the Internet’s unique attributes is that all sides of an argument have
equal access to the same audience, perhaps even in the same forum. A
person who believes that he or she has been defamed has an immediate
opportunity to correct inaccurate information or to counter unfounded
accusations. Indeed, the stringent “actual malice” standard for publicfigure defamation is partly based on the reasoning that public figures
usually have “effective opportunities for rebuttal.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344
(“The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help — using
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby
to minimize its adverse impact on reputation.”). Thus, the immunity
granted by Section 230 is likely to have a far smaller impact on the subject
of allegedly defamatory Internet content than a similar immunity might
have in more traditional media.
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Finally, Section 230 does not leave victims of defamation without
recourse; the actual information content provider remains liable. Zeran,
129 F.3d at 330 (“None of this means, of course, that the original culpable
party who posts defamatory messages would escape accountability.”).
Indeed, the plaintiffs have sued Tim Bolen, the author of the message
republished by Rosenthal. This, too, acts as a counterbalance to the
Congressional decision to provide immunity to Internet intermediaries.
CONCLUSION
Online forums are the modern soapboxes of our age, where the
public can debate and comment on the issues of the day, allowing discourse
on the widest range of topics and opinions. Both the providers of these
interactive computer services and the users of the forums enhance this
discourse through the republication and distribution of information from
other sources. Accordingly amici respectfully urge this Court to respect the
policy choice made by Congress to promote and protect this valuable forum
by reversing the Court of Appeal’s ruling.
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